Corporate governance in Central and Eastern Europe : lessons from advanced market economies by Gray, Cheryl W. & Hanson, Rebecca J.
Policy Rsawroh
WORKING  PAPERS
Tas  Won  and UaouoAdJust.nt
Policy  Research  Department





and Eastern  Europe
Lessons  from  Advanced
Market  Economies
Cheryl  W.  Gray
and
Rebecca  J. Hanson
The countries  of Central  and Eastern  Europe  need to ,rr on the
side  of stronger  and more  active  corporate  governance.  German
and Japanese  models  may  offer some  clues.
P  y Ru  W  gpdi  nsat  Ub  findina  iof  wi  in  pepm ad umnpdamicfmidim  Baa  saffad
inItdgis.,ed*s1duImndIaaroIay.Thdndinp.amSS,_3.adOlwkCi5UhSthaU_oWTbqmIi

















































































































TfansltUon  and lacro-Adlmmot3
WPS 1182
This paper -a  preduct of the  Transition  and Macro-Adjustment  Division,  Policy  Research  Department
- is part  of a larger  effort  in the department  to analyze  the  economic  impact  of legal  reform  in Central  and
Eastem Europe.  The study  was fimded  by the Bank's  Researchi  Support  Budget  under the research  ptoject
"Corporate  rovernance in Central  Europe"  (RPO  678-42).  Copies  of this  paper  are available  free  from  the
World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Maxine  Berg, room Nl 1-057,
extension 31450  (September  1993,  30 peges).
Patterns  of coiporate  ownership  and govemance  greater  incentives  and lower costs for share-
in advanced  market  economies  vary immensely,  holder  monitoring.  Yet Central and Eastem
the result  not only of policy  choice but of cultural  European  industrial  structures  tend to be quite
and political  differences  and historical  accident.  highly  concentrated.  There  may be other benefits
None  of those patterns  can be copied wholesale  to preserving  such concentration  in some indus-
onto the Central  and Eastem European  srene.  tries, but antimonopoly  and privatization  policies
But the experiences  of Germany,  Japan, and the  should  not leave the govemance  issue out of the
United  States  do point  to certain  lessons  and  equation.
tradeoffs  that the Central and Eastem European
countries  should consider.  Finally,  there is clearly  an important  and
difficult  tradeoff  between  the efficacy  of corpo-
First, there is probably  some tradeoff  be-  rate governance  and concerns  of safety and
tween  the distribution  of wealth  and the tificacy  soundness  in financial  intermediaries.  The
of corporate  govemance  in an economy.  Theory  United  States  represents  one extreme,  where
and to some extent practice  support  the view that  concerns  of safety  and soundness  dominate,
tighter  ownership  patterns  lead to better corpo-  limiting  active  participation  in corporate  gover-
rate performance.  But more widely  dispersed  nance by banks,  insurance  companies,  pension
ownership  patterns  clearly  have other  economic  funds, and mutual funds.  Germany  and Japan are
and social benefits  that are important  in tne  on the other side, allowing  financial  intermediar-
Central and Eastern  European  context and to  ies (and other related  firms) a major voice in
some extent (along  with speed)  motivate  the  corporate  govemance.  Unfortunately,  this
"mass privatization"  plans. The use of institu-  tradeoff  is even more  difficult  in Central and
tional intermediaries  and creative  legal frame-  Eastern  Europe  because  of the lack of altemative
works  to concentrate  voice  more than ownership  tools to achieve  either goal. On the one hand,
may be a partial  solution  to the dilemma.  Stron-  legal and information  systems are relatively
ger and more committed  voice  might also be  weak,  making  it diffieult  to identify and elimi-
gained by encouraging  ownership  by parties  with  nate irresponsible  self-dealing  by fiduciaries  in
other long-term  contractual  interests,  whether  as  the intermediary  institutions.  Furthermore,  the
suppliers,  employees,  or creditors.  high degree of risk in these  economies  argues
strongly  in favor of diversification  on the
Second,  there is likely to be some tradeoff  grounds  of safety and soundness.  On the other
between  industrial  structure  and the efficacy  of  hand, product,  capital,  and labor  markets are
corporate  governance.  Given a certain  dispersion  often  underdeveloped,  so there may be few other
of ownership  in an economy,  smalle firms mean  constraints  to discipline  company  managers  in
fewer owners,  greater  stakes per owner, and  the absence  of active  shareholder  monitoring.
IThe  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  dissemninate  the  fmdings  of work  under  way  in  the Bank.  An  objective  of the series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The findings, interpetations, and
conclur orns  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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Corporate Governance in Central and  Eastern Europe:
Lessons  from  Advanced  Market  Economies
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe iCEE) are moving rapidly to privatize
state enterprises aAd  remrove  centralized administrative  controls over the economy.  This
move towards private ownership is based on the underlying proposition that the incentives
created by private ownership will lead to a more efficient economy.  For tilis to happen,
however, ownership must be coupled with some degree of shareholder control over
managerial  decision making in a firmn. While good corporate govemance is a key to the
sound functioning  of any private market economy, the need for massive enterprise
restructuring  in reforning socialist  economies  arguably heightens the importance  of effective
corporate governance (and may change the nature of governance issues) in those settings.
Policy makers and advisors are justifiably giving great attention to techniques  of
privatization  and to details of implementation,  but less attention  to what havpens next.  In
what legal, economic, and cultural environment  will these firms operate?  Who will be
and/or should be their new owners, managers, and overseers? Is an adequate le--- and
informational  framework in place to promote fiduciary responsibility  on the par,  n  such
managers and overseers? Even after privatization,  governments will contiPue  to play the
important  role of d0ining the basic legal framework  for private ownership and control.
What is "Corporate Governance"?
Managers in a market economy face a wide array of constraints, both economic  and
legal, facing managers 2s they carry ouit  their jobs (Figure 1).  On the economic side.
product markets and the desire to avoid bankruptcy  clearly constrain managerial  behavior.
Capital markets exert discipline  on managers  of those firms that must raise money externally.
Labor markets constrain managers  to the extent their jobs are contestable  or they expect to
seek other employment  in the future.  On the legal side, govemnment  regulations  and laws of
fiduciary responsibility  can constrain managerial  behavior.  A further, and very powerful,
constraint on managerial  behavior is the cultural norm of commercial  behavior prevailing in
an economy.
The focus of this paper is on the type of constraint on managerial  behavior most
typically  associated  with the term "corporate  governance": shareholder monitoring. Although
shareholder  monitoring  is onlv one of numerous constraints  on managerial  behavior in
advanced market economies, it is likely to be more important in the earlv stages of reform  in
CEE economies  to the extent that markets  for products, capital, and manaeerial labor are
still underdeveloped  and thus do not yet exert strong competitive  pressures on nmanagers.Eigurei:  THE  MANY  CONSTRAINTS  ON  MANAGERS
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Shareholder monitoring  can b2 passive or active.  Passive shareholders  rely on "exit" as their
main discipline  on managers, while active shareholders rely more heavily on "voice".  The
U.S. model, for example, is heavily weighted  towards "exit," while the German and
Japanese niodels rely more on "voice."'  Thie  various systems in advanced market economies
each have advantages  and disadvantages. Each is in maniy  ways a unique outgrowth of
cotintry-specific  economic, political, historic. and cultural factors, and it is neither desirable
nor possible to "import" an entire model inte the CEE context. However, it is possible to
isolate certain characteristics  of particular systems that might work or not work well i.. the
CEE context, at least in the short.-  to medium-run.  In Central  and Eastern Europe, whe.-e
stock markets are poorly developed, exit is unlikely to be an efficient option  for some time to
come, an.. thus active shareholder  monitoring  is likely to be one of the most important modes
of corporate governance  in the near tenn.
The legal framework in an econo.ny influences  shareholder  monitoring in two critica;
ways, as explored in turn below.  First, it governs ownership patterns: who may own
companies, how much they may own, and to what extent they can exert an "active"
ownership role.  Second, it translates this ownership structure into shareholder influence
through the definition  of share voting rights and duties, share voting rules, and the structure
and composition of oversight bodies within the company.  Experience  in advanced market
economies  shows that ownership patterns and the legal frameworks in which owners exert
control can vary immensely, leading to major differences in models of corporate govemance,
managerial behavior, and arguably firm performance (although  the latter relationship .s
difficult to prove empirically). In the CEE context, where markets are not in equilibrium
and whe-e major improvements  in efficiency  are likely to depend not so much on marginal
changes in managerial  behavior as on successful  large-scale restructuring  at the firrm  level,
alternative patterns of corporate govemance should be judged not only on how they affect
day-to-day  decision making but also on how they affect a finnrs capacity for change and
restructuring.
1.  It is also interesting to niote  that the various systems appear to be evolving more toward each other over
time,  as critics of the U.S.  system argue for more voice,  while critics of the German  and Japanese
system argue  for more openness,  flexibility, and ease of entry and exit.  For a strong argument that the
U.S.  needs more emphasis on  "voice" (i.e.  more "dedicated capital") and  less on "exit."  see M.E.
Porter,  "Capital Choices:  Changing the Way America  Invests in Industry,"  Council on Competitiveness
and  Harvard Business School, June  1"92.  For an argument  that the German and Japanese systems are
too protected and tend to entrench management, see J.  Abegglen and G. Stalk. Kaisha,  the Japanese
Cororation,  (New York:  Basic Books),  1985.  For evidence that the two systems are  moving closer
together,  see D. Sharfstein,  "Japanese Corporate  Finance and Governance:  Implications for the
Privatization of Eastem  European  Enterprises,"  mimeo, January  1992 (which discusses  how Japan's
derce-ulation of  its corporate  bond market in the late  1980s led to a significant weakening in keiretsu
ween banks and those firms strong enough to obtain  financtng on  international bond markets)
and J.  Pound,  'Beyond  Takeovers:  Politics Comes to Corporate Control,"  Harvard  Business Review,
March-April  1992 (which discusses the growing  "voice" being exerted  by investors in the U.S.).4
Owngrship Rules and Corporate  Governance
O)wnership  Rules in Advanced  Market Economies
Patterns of coroorate ownership (Table 1) and models of corporate governance vary
widely among advanced market economies.  Although cultural characwristics  miay  account
for some of this difference, much is due directly to the wide differences  in their legal
frameworks for company ownership. In the U.S.. legal restrictions  originally designed to
protect investors and depositors and fragment financial power have led to a relatively small
role for institutional  intermediaries  in both ownership and monitoring  ot large companies. 2
The Glass-Steagall  Act of 1933 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 restrict banks
from holding direct and active equity interests in companies  or affiliating with investment
banks, mutual funds, securities Lusinesses,  or insurance companies. As a result, banks play
virtually no role in company ownership or governance. Other financial  institutions--such  as
insurance  companies, pension funds, and niutual funds--play  a relatively modest role, in large
part due to legal requirements for diversification  based on notions of safety and soundness.
A variety of state regulat.ons  restrict life ir surance companies  from owning large blocks of
individual  firns'  stock. 3 Pension funds ar,  in practice restricted  from takhig large stakes in
firmns  by the "prudent man" rule of the Emr  loyee Retirement  Investor Security Act (ERISA).
Mutual funds are in essence prevented from buying more than 10 percent of a company's
stock (and inhinited from buying more than 5 percent) by regulatory  and tax restrictions. 4
Furthermore, any active shareholder  or shareholding  group that acquires a 5 perceri stake in
2.  See S.D.  Prowse.  "Institutional Investment  Patterns and Corporate  Financial Behavior in the U.S. and
Japan."  J.  Fin.  Econ. 27 (1990), and M.J.  Roe,  "A Political Theory of American  Corporate  Finance,"
91 Col. L. Rev.  10 (1991).
3.  Nlost states limit total investments of insurance companies in common stocks to between 2 and 25
percent ef assets, and investments in stock of individual companies are subject to even lower limits.
W. McCown and S. Martinie,  "State Regulation of  Life Insurance Companies,"  Association of Life
Insurance Counsel Proceedings  !7,  1988.
4.  The Investment Company Act of  1940 and  the Internal  Revenue Code together provide "pass-through"
tax treatment only to "diversified" mutual funds.  At least half of the investments of a  "diversified"
fund must be in companies constituting at most 5 percent of the fund's  portfolio and at most  10 percent
of the company's  outstanding stock.  The other half can be in investments constituting no more than  25
percent  of the  fund's assets,  but other restrictions  apply if the fund owns 5 percent or more of a
company's  stock or  has a  representative on the company's  board.  In essence the  1940 Act almost
insures that mutual funds will act only as passive investors but not as active corporate  overseers.  M.J.
Roe,  "Poli:ical and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Companies,"  J.  Fin. Econ.  27
(1990),  p.13.5
Table  1:  OWNieRSHIPR  OF COMMON  STOCK--1970 AND 1988--as a Perce..tage
of Total Outstanijing Common Shares
U.S.b  Japan  Germany4
1970
Financial Institutions  15.8  34.9  12
Commercial Bankls  0  11.6  8
Insurnce  Companies  2.9  15.4  }  4
Pension  Funds  8.2  }  7.8
Other Financial  4.7  0
Nonfinancial Business  9.1  21.8  39
Individuals  72.2  39.9  29
Foreignprs  2.9  3.2  10
Other  0  0.2  10
1988
Financial Institutions  30.4  51.2  22
Commercial  Banks  0  18.9  10
Insurance Companies  4.6  19.6  }  12
Pension Funds  20.1  }  12.7
Other Financial  5.7  0
Nonfinancial Business  14.1  24.9  42
Individuals  50.2  22.4  17
Foreigners  5.4  4.0  14
Other  0  0.7  5
Source:  Prowse, S.D.,  "Comments on the Changing Role of Institutional Investors in the Financial
and Governance  Markets"  in Sametz, A.W.,  ed. Institutional Investine. The Challenees  and
Responsibilities  ot the 21st  Centurv,  with later updates from the author.
a  Shares held in trusts are  counted as individual holdings.
Intercorporate holdings estimated using methods employed in Tri (1971).
c  Holdings including preferred  as well as comror  shares.
d  Most recent  figures for Gerniany are for  1982.6
a con.pany must file with the SEC under the Securities Exchange  Ac5 and related nile.
revealing  ownership, plans, and sources of financing. Large holdings are also deterred by
Section 16(b) of the Act, which disallows short-swing  profits by shareholders owning more
than 10 percent of a company's stock, regardless  of whether inside information  was
izivolved.' Finally, non-financial  institutions  are discouraged  from owning shares of other
companies  by tax laws that subiect dividends  from intercnrporatl wortfolio  investments  to
multiple layers of taxation.  As a result, it is not surprising that individuals  own a major
portion of shares in U.S. companies.
In contrast, institutions  play a much larger role in Germany  and Japan, where they
have more latitude to own equity and exert active control over firms.  In Germany, banks
may own up to 100 percent of a company. Thus, banks and the investment comp.nies they
control have significant  direct ownership interests in f  irms, aad an even larger voice in
monitoring due to their legal rights under existing proxy rules to vote the shares of clients for
whom they act as custodian.  In the typical large German firm.,  three banks control (through
ownership or proxies) about 30 percent of the voting stock, in many of the largest
companies, they have majority control.  In comp-.rison,  the top five institational  shareholders
in U.S. companies  control on average about 5 percent of shares in large firms. 8
Nonfinancial  ftirms  also have large equity holdings in Germany, as shown in Table 1.
Institutions  play a large role in Japan as wel!.  After World War II, the U.S. imposed
on Japan a form of Glass-Steagall  that disallowed bar', ownership of more than 10 percent of
a company's stock.  This threshold was lowered to 5 percent in 1987.  respite  this legal
similarity with the U.S., Japanese banks are still influential  in corporate govemance because
5.  Section 13 (d) of the Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934  requires any perzon who acquires more than 5
percent of any class of equity securities  registered under the act to file a statement with the SEC within
ten days after the purchase.  It must describe the person's background.  source of funds, the purpose of
the acquisition.  any plans for major  changes in the target company,  and any contracts or arrangements
with any other person relating  to the target company. Section 14(d)  requires a person macing a tender
offer for moLe  than 5 percent of any class of registered equity  security to file  a statement with the SEC
describing  the same infornation as above.
6.  See Rne, su2ra note 4. p.  18.
7.  Most shares  in German companies  are bearer shares, and shareholders  often deposit the share
certificates  at their banks.  Banks  offer clients custodial  services. includirg the handling  of dividends
and the voting  of stock at the annual meetings. Before  an annual meeting, the bank must recommend
to its customers  how to vote.  Unless  the customer gives the bank specific voting instructions  (which  is
rare), the bank will vote the custodial  shares on its own recommendation. In contrast, proxy rules in
the U.S. cancel the voting rights of any shareholder  that does not actively indicate  a voting position  or
affirmatively  delegate  voting power  to a proxy voter.
8.  M.J. Roe, "Some  Differences  in Corporate Structure  in Germany,  Japan, and the Unitea States,"  102
Yale Law  Journal 1, 1993.7
of the "keiretsu" forr  of organ;zation.' Many other regu[ltions that exist in the U.S. do not
constrain Japanese banks, and the latter are much larger, miore  active, and rnore powertil in
influencing the voting patterr.3  of other keiretsu nembers than are baniks  in the U.S.
Typicaliy the "main" bank owns 5 percen. of any industrial firmn  in the keiretsul aiid
fina.'cial institutions  in the keiretsu own some 20 percent more."  The role Ot these
financial ;nstittitions  is comnlemented  bv that of the other firnns  in the keiretsu who also ow0n
significant  ainounts of each ulher's stock  . Financial institutioi.s  also own sizeable blocks ot
shares in firms that are not in keiretsu groupings, tgain due to less restrictive investment
regulations.  ln total, banks, insurance companies,  and pension  funds together own about half
of all outstanding  shares of listed companie'  ,  and other nontinancial tinns own another
quarter.
Corporate ¶Jovernance  and the Dispersion of Ownership
Theoa  arkndeece  in  dvanced market economies. TY,  'iffictilty  of shareholder
monitosiimg  in large corporations stems from the separation  of owinership  from management
and the costs of ccllective action among disparate shareholders. Standard economic  theory
holds that wid.r ownership dispersion leads to greater shareholder  passivity.  This is because
shareholders  with small holdings will gain relatively little from improved  company
performance  and thus will not have adequate incentive  to invest the optimum  amount of
resources in monitoring.  Rather, they have an incentive  to "free ride" on others' efforts.
However, if all shareholders  take this apparently rational view, there will be no oversight  at
all, and trranagers  will be free to misuse corporate resource3  and maximize  their own
personal gain rather than that of the company  and its owners.  Furthermore, with a large
number of shareholders, the transaction costs of organizing  shareholders  to exert a unified
voice are high, thus inhibiting  collective  action still further.  In general, this theory suggests
that shareholder  monitoring is likely to be harder in larger firms--at least to the extent there
are more owners, a greater separation  of ownership and management,  and higher infor.nation
and transaction  costs involved in collec.tive  action.  Owners of smnall  companies  are likci
9.  "Keiretsu"  are groups of firms and financial  intermediaries  that own large blocks of each other's stock
and also deal with each other extensively  on a commercial  basi3.
10.  See Roe, supra note 8, pp. 22-26.
11.  Roe, id.,p.  9.
12.  The incentives  are not always  obvious  even in this pure model, however. While small shareholder
passivity  is no doubt widespread, it should be noted that small holdings  in a very large company may in
fact translate into a significant  individual  gain from active involvement.  Pound cites the case of
Mobil, where a one percent share of total stock has a market  value of some $200 million. If faced
with a corporate  measure that could affect the stock price 20 percent ($40 million)  either way, the
shareholder  may prefer to spend the money  to research and lobby on the issue (perhaps  a few hundred
thousand  dollars)  than to pay the commission  (perhaps  $2 rnillion)  incurred upoi' sale of the stock.  J.
Pound, supra note 1, p. 83.8
either to be mnanagers  themsel"es or to have the ability and the incentive to oversee
management  closely, but both the agency problems  and the costs of monitorinig  rise as firms
become larger and ownership more diffuse.
The availability  of exit mechanisms  will also affect an investor's inceritive  to
participate in turning a company around.  Thus, the presence of a highiy liquid stock
exchange (-s in the U.S.), which Drovides  a seller with ready buyer, may temnpt  shareholders
to baii out of a troubled firm if the costs of that bailout are lower th,an  the costs of reforrning
and monitoring  management. A liquid market will also make it easier for outsiders to
acquire troubled firms that they believe can be iurned around with new management.
Indeed, the lack of a more liquid stock market may be a partial explanation  for the lack of
takeover activity in both Gerrnany  and Japan.' 3
The results of resecrch on the correlation between ownership con.ientratioo,
managerial  oversight, and company  performance in advanced market economies is
ambiguous.' 4 Some research does support the contention  that more concentrated  ownershlp
leads to better corporate performance, particularly in low-tech, mature industries.' 5 Specific
cases in which shareholder monitoring  is known to have hnxd  a positive impact reinforce these
statistical studies.' 6 Other research, however. fails to find a clear correlation between
ownership dispersion  and profitability in either the U.S." 7 or Japan.' 8 Still other research
questions the direction of causation implied  by theory and hypothesizes  that ownership
structure may be a dependent rather than an independent  variable.  Demsetz and Lehn
hypothesize  that for some industries (for exarnp!e,  where fu'm-specLfic  risk is high)
=oncentrated  (  ,nership is advantageous  while for others it may not be, and that market
13.  Although this  relative illiquidity may be advartageous  to the extent  it heightens  incentives for
shareholder monitoring,  there are offsetting disadvantages to the economy as a whole.  One such
disadvantage  ij the difficulty that small, somewhat risky new firms may have in obtaining  financing.
For example,  some observers  have questioned whether App  Computer would have been able to grow
and thrive in the Gernan  system.
14.  B. Black,  "The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring:  The Empirical  Evidence,"  39 UCLA L.
Rev.  895  (1992).
15.  Salancik & Pfeffer,  "Effects of Ownership and Performance  on Executive Tenure in U.S.
Corporations,"  23 Acad. Mgmt J. 653 (1980), and  Zechhauser & Pound,  "Are Large  Shiareholders
Effective Monitors?:  An Investigation of  Share Ownership and Corporate  Performance,"  in Asymmetric
Inforrr,-ion.  Corporate  Finance and Investment  149,  166-70 (R. Hubbard ed.  1990).
16.  See the examples of  General Motors, Turner  Broadcasting,  and J.P.  Morgan & Co. cited  in Black,
supra note  14.
17.  See, for example,  Holderness & Sheehan,  "The Role of Majority Shar^holders  in the Publicly Held
Corporation,"  20 J.  Fin.  Econ. 317 (1988).
18.  S. Prowse,  "The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan,"  Journal  of Finance 47:3,  July  1992.9
forces will push finns  to the optimal result." 9 This view meshes well with the
characterization of shareholder monitoring as but one of many constraints facing managers:  if
other constraints (such as competition in product or capital markets) are tight,  shareholder
monitoring may be less important for efficiency.
Institutional ownership  helps to address the "free rider"  problems by combining
widespread wealth distribution  with concentrated  shareholder voice.20 As seen in Table  1,
ownership by individuals fell significantly from  1970 to  1988 in all three countries,  while
institutional ownership  rose.  This evolution over the past few decades toward more
institutional ownership  in advanced market economies lends indirect support to the contention
that more concentrated ownership--or  at least more concentrated  oversight (whether through
exit or voice)--is likely to be associated with greater efficiency.
Implications for Central  and Eastern Europe.  In the CEE countries,  the mode of
privatization  is likely to be the single most important factor determining the initial
distribution  of share ownership.  Direct sales and management buyouts will produce
concentrated  direct ownership,  employee buyouts will lead to a somewhat less concentrated
form of direct ownership,  and mass distribution programs  (voucher schemes) will result in a
widely dispersed shareholding body.  If vouchers are used to buy shares in companies,  this
ownership  will be direct;  if they are used to buy shares in financial intermediaries,  ownership
of firms  will be indirect (i.e. direct  ownership will be by the intermediaries themselves).  In
all of these cases, patterns of ownership will change as stock markets develop and shares are
traded,  leading to greater or  lesser dispersion.  Given the relatively equal distribution of
wealth and human capital in these countries,  however,  patterns of ownership  may well
continue to be quite widely dispersed,  particularly  in those countries  that start out with mass
privatization. How to maintain efficient corporate  governance  while moving away  from
central administrative  control toward widely dispersed ownership is a central issue
throughout  the region.
If efficiency is the paramount  concern,  CEE countries  would arguably be wise to push
toward more concentrated ownership through direct  sales of privatized firms to individual
owners (in essence the Hungarian  model).  Problems associated with such sales,  notably
slowness and the scarcity of domestic capital, can be addressed without dispersing  share
ownership widely through voucher schemes.  Foreigners  with capital can be wooed as
buyers, as has been done extensively in Hungary.  Alternatively,  implicit or explicit  subsidies
can lower the sale price cri that domestic entrepreneurs  can afford  to purchase firms.  If
19.  Demsetz  & Lehn, "The Structure of Corporate  Ownership: Causes  and Consequences."  93 J. Pol.
Econ. 1  155  (1985).
20.  Sonie intermediaries,  such as mutual  funds, provide  a concentrated  voice but essentially  leave
shareholdings  widely dispersed. Other institutions.  such as insura ce companies  and pension funds.
concentrate  actual share ownership  while distributing  other wealth claims widely.  Banks in Germany
do both: they hold shares  on their own account and vote the shares of entrusting  private individuals.10
efficiency is to be strictly puisued,  these subsidies can be limited to  insiders,  who have
privileged access to information and a direct  influence in the company and are likely to act
quickly with sufficient incentive.  The spontaneous Drivatizations that have occurred  (with or
without official blessing) throughout Central and Eastern Europe are exactly this--cheap and
quick sales to insiders.  In Croatia,  the privatization  law provides for insider buyouts over
several  years at low cost.
A major constraint on direct  sales to dominant o'vners--and  also on corporate
governance--in the CEE context is the sheer  size of many firms.  CEE firms are on average
much larger than their counterparts  in mature market economies,  because concentrating
production  of a particular  product in a single firm (the "one product-one firm"  approach)
minimized the transaction costs of central planning.  Breaking up large firrns prior  to
privatization  may make sense not only from an antimonopoly perspective but also from a
corporate  govemance one.
Furthernore,  even if one accepts the view that concentrated  ownership furthers
corporate  efficiency, there may be overriding  reascns  to favor more dispersed ownership
patterns.  In CEE, assets owned by the state during socialist times were  in theory owned on
behalf of "the people,"  and many now believe they should be returned to those same people.
Socialist ideals of equality of wealth are still quite strong, and widespread distribution  of
share ownership,  at least initially,  fits those ideals.  A further argument in favor of more
dispersed  share, ownership is that wider ownership and increased tradit.g of shares among the
public facilitates the growth of a securities market.  The mass privatization programs  of
CSFR,  Poland, and Romania are in part rooted in such beliefs and on the desire to gain
support for privatization among the population at large.
Widespread ownership and active shareholder monitoring are not necessarilv
incompatible and can best be achieved through the establishment of institutional
intermediaries to hold and vote shaares  on behalf of individuals.  Poland,  Romania,  and CSFR
have recognized the value of institutional intermediaries by including them in the countries'
mass privatization plans.  The Polish and Romanian  plans specifically set up investment
funds to hold all shares of privatized firms on behalf of the public (which in turn owns shares
in the intermediaries),  while the CSFR plan allows the public to choose  between direct
shareholding in privatized entities or  indirect shareholding through  one of several competing
investment funds.  The free entry of intermediaries in the CSFR has a significant advantage
over the "top-down" approach of Poland and Romania,  in that it encourages  both competition
and specialization.  Ultimate ownership patterns  will be determined in large part by the
extent to which individuals can and do invest their vouchers in the fuinds or in firms
themselves.  Experience in the "first wave" of CSFR privatization  indicates that ownership of
privatized  finns  may indeed be more concentrated  than originally expected even in the case11
of mass privatization,  although the concentration  will be more in the hands ot  institutional
intermediaries than direct investors.-l
Apart from investment funds, pension funds and insurance companies can also  serve
an analogous role of owning shares on behalf of individual inivestors.  Although th  y have
received less attention in the privatization debate,  there has been some etfort to encoLurage  the
growth of pension funds through  privatization.  Slovenia's  recently-approved  privatization
law,  for example, allocates  10 percent of the shares of privatized companies to goveriment-
established pension funds.' 2 Similarly, banks are entitled to own shares in companiies in
most CEE countries, and they may become stibstantial owners if debt is swapped for equity
as proposed  in some programs  of joint bank/enterprise  restructuring.
To encourage the growth of intermediaries, the CEE countries should avoid
overregulating  the involvement of intermediaries in companies.  In the United States. the
broad array of state and federal  laws discussed earlier limits the ability of intermediaries to
own large blocks of shares  in individual firms.  These various rules are intended to protect
investors and workers by assuring diversification  in the investment of their assets by
intermediaries.  While safety and soundness are certainly valid concerns,  these rules
seriously  limit the ability of these institutional intermediaries to exert a voice in corporate
governance. 23 In contrast,  intermediaries in German and Japan are much less restricted,  and
as a result they exert a much larger voice in corporate  governance.  In the CEE environment,
where the idea of corporate  governance is so new and untested and where markets are not yet
well-developed,  encouraging active shareholder  monitoring should be a high priority of
policy makers.  Intermediaries  are likely to develop better access to information,  closer ties
to firm  managers, greater  experience and expertise  in economic and financial matters, and
deeper knowledge of the specific businesses in which they invest than individual investors
21.  J. Svejnar  and M. Singer, "'The  Czechosiovak  Voucher Privatization:  An Assessment  of Results," paper
presented at the  1993 Meetings of the American  Economic Association. January 1993.
22.  Another interesting example is Chile, where  privatization efforts  have been closely linked with the
country's  transition from a public pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) pension systems to a private fully-funded
one.
23.  An alternative theory holds that institutional passivity has not resulted primarily from overregulation,
but from the insufficiency of existing incentives to motivate institutional money managers to monitor.
Where a fluid stock exchange is present,  institutional investors would prefer to exit the corporation
rather  than reform it.  Additionally, shareholders do not have the power to oust intermediaries'
managers as they might in a corporation.  For example,  while corporate  management is subject to the
disciplinary threats of hostile takeovers, proxy  fights, and other corporate control actions,  managers of
most institutional investors are  not.  Pension funds are  immune from other capital market pressures  in
that they are creditors,  not debtors (as corporations are).  Even if an intermediary's  substandard
performance is detected, problems of collective action  are potentially more severe at the institutional
level than at the corporate level,  maiinly  because among beneficiaries there is no analogue to the large
shareholder who may be willing to become a  monitor.  See, J.  Coffee,  "Liquidity Versus Control:  T'he
Institutional Investor as Corporate  Monitor,"  91 Col.  L. Rev.  1277,  1283 (1991).12
can develop.- 4 For all of these reasc.as,  their involvement  in ownership and corporate
governance in CEE is critical.  The proper balance. when weighed against safety and
soundness  concerns, is likely to result in less stringent regulations  on internediarv ownership
than in the United States.
More concentrated  and active participation  of intennediaries in corporate governance
will need to be accompanied,  however, by regulation  to encourage fiduciary responsibility
and eliminate self-dealing  by institutional  sh  ireholders.  In other words, the intermediaries
also need effective  corporate governance, influenced  both by their investor clients and by
external government  regu'ators.  Protection of minority shareholders  of the firms being
governed  is typically handled in company and securities laws, while both general an
institution-specific  laws on fiduciary responsibility  protect shareholders in the intenr,  -ies
themselves. Such regulation will be difficult in the early years of reform due to the  _-11ties.
of the challenge, the lack of strong market-oriented  legal and regulatory institutions.  .e
general paucity of information  and underdeveloped  means for forcing its production (  . n  s
auditing  and disclosure  rules and "discovery" procedures).
Self-monitoring  among intermnediaries  may also help to control self-dealing  when
other legal and/or cultural constraints are weak.  In Japan, where external legal controls are
particularly weak, observers stress the importance  of the existence  of several large
shareholders  in controlling self-dealing  by any particular one. 25 To this end it might be
useful to prevent outright majority ownership of large companies  by one intermediary  by
imposing  maximum  limits (perhaps on the order or 25-35 percent) on their ownership of
shares in any one firm.
In addition  to encouraging the growth of responsible  intermediaries,  laws should
minimize limits on the transferability  of shares.  To promote competition  and the
development  of capital markets, shareholders  should be encouraged to move their holdings
among intermediaries  and/or direct interests in companies. Furthermore, the evolution
toward more concentrated  ownership patterns should be ailowed to proceed.  A fair initial
distribution  of wealth may be desirable; restrictions  that lock in that distribution are unlikely
to be.
Corporate Governance  and the Type of Owner
Theory and evidence in advanced market economies.  The above discussion focused
on the dispersion  of ownership. Assuming  a certain degree of ownership concentration, does
it then matter to the effectiveness  of shareholder  monitoring who these owners are?  Do
different types of owners face different incentives  that influence  their goals in monitoring and
24.  Because  domestic  expertise  is likely  to be scarce in the short-run, free entry of foreign  expertise
through management  contracts or direct ovwnership  should be encouraged.
25.  See Roe, supra note 8.13
their ability to monitor. Looking again at Table 1, one can see the variety of possible
owners.  Financial institutions  can be shareholders  on their own account (such as insurance
companies, pension funds, and German or Japanese banks) or as intermediaries  for others
(such as mutual funds and bank trust departments  or the equivalent). Nonfinancial  businesses
can own shares in each other merely as arms-length  portfolio investors or as more interested
parties linked together through regular commercial  dealings (as in Japan).  Individual
shareholders  can be merely external portfolio investors or can be insiders (whether managers,
board members, or workers).  Finally, the state can be a large shareholder, as it is likely to
remain for some time in the CEE countries.
Different  types of owners face different types of incentives  to monitor corporate
management. The incentive to monitor can be enhanced  by link'ng ownership ties with other
economic relationships  in an economy, i.e. by developing shareholders  with a heightened
interest in the ongoing  performance of the.firm ("linked" shareholders). This is in essence
the basis of the much-discussed  models of corporate governance in Japan and Germany.
Banks are significant  owners of firms in both countries. These banks not only invest in these
firms, but they lend to them on an ongoing basis.6 Their simultaneous  debt and equity
interests appear to reduce the inherent conflicts between shareholders  and debt holders,
tempering both the incentive  of shareholders  to make suboptimal  investments  that
compromise creditors' interests 27 and the incentive  of creditors to recover debts at the
expense of the firm's long-term interests.  When a company  encounters trouble, lenders who
also hold equity interests are more likely to work with them on designing and financing
restructuring  and rehabilitation  plans. 28 In contrast, if the only relationship  was a
r-reditor/debtor  one, banks would have a stronger impetus to push an illiquid firm into
bankruptcy  before remaining assets are used or claimed by other creditors.
Banks are not the only shareholders  that can have other, non-equity interests in firms.
Companies  that deal with each other commercially  also have extensi'  cross-holdings  of
equity, which increases  their incentive to monitor the health of thiese  commercial  partners,
rather than simply  exit in times of trouble.  In Japan, for example, Mitsubishi Heavy
26.  In one study of 85 keiretsu,  the largest shareholder  is also the largest creditor  in 55 cases.  In most
keiretsu firms, the majority of  its debt is held by other keiretsu members,  whether  financial institutions
or nonfinancial firms that extend trade credit.  S. Prowse.  sunra note  18.  It should be noted, however,
that the past decade has seen a significant switch in Japanese enterprise  finance away  from  "main bank"
financing toward more arms-len-th  financing through the corporate bond market.  This shift followed
Japanese legislation that make it easier for Japanese firms to issue bonds,  which were  themselves more
mnarketable  due to the growth  in profitability and reputation of Japanese industry.  D. Sharfstein,  suplA
note 1.
27.  M.C.  Jensen and  W. Meckling,  "The Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior,  Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure,"  J.  Fin.  Econ.  3, 305-360, and  S. Prowse, sup  note 2.
28.  T. Hoshi,  A. Kashyap,  and D.  Scharfstein,  "The Role of  Banks in Reducing  the Costs of  Financial
Distress in Japan,"  J.  Fin.  Econ.  27,  1990.14
Industries is the largest shreholder  ir. Mitsubishi Steel and also an important supplier of its
equipment  and large purchaser of its output.9 Again, the two economic relationships  can
work to reinforce one another. 30 In addition to assisting a troubled company, a firm is more
likely to fulfill its commercial  obligations  to another firm that is also an owner; if a dispute
arises, the cross-holdings  between the parties give them a greater incentive  to find a
negotiated  solution that preserves the longer-term  commercial  relationship.  In this way
corporate cross-holdings  can serve as an informnal  mechanism  of contract enforcement, to a
large extent substituting  for more formal legal procedures.  Extensive corporate ,  oss-
holdings may well help to account, for example, for the relatively small number of
commercial  law cases in Japan, when compared with the U.S..
The above two examples show how overlapping debt/equity  or sales/equity  contracts
can reinforce shareholder  monitoring and effective corporate governance. A third possible
overlap is between lauor and equity contracts.  Ownership  of stock by "in3iders"  enhances
shareholder  monitoring, because employees have both more information  about company
perfonnance and more to lose if such performance is poor.  Insiders can be either company
managers  and directors, or employees  at all levels.  The former is common in the United
States, where manager  or director compensation  is often tied to company perforrnance
through stock options and other performance-based  compensation  schemes. 31 This is less
common in Japan, where managers own little stock in their own companies  than in the
U.S. 32 Although empirical evidence on the impact of insider ownership by officers and
directors in the U.S. is mixed, it seems  to give modest support to the view that some inside
ownership is likely to improve performance. 33
29.  C. Kester, Japanese Takeovers:  The Global Contest for Corporate  Control,  Cambridge:  Harvard
Business School Press,  1990.
30.  R.J. Gilson and M.J.  Roe,  "Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps  Between Corporate
Governance and Industrial  Organization,"  Columbia  Law School, Center  for Law & Economic Studies
Working Paper,  August  1992.
31.  One study found that the average  combined ownership of all board members in a  sample of Fortune
500 firms was 10.6 percent.  R.  Morch,  A. Schleifer, and R.  Vishny,  "Management Ownership and
Market  Valuation: An Empirical  Analysis,'  J.  Fin. Econ.  20,  1988.
32.  For example,  a recent study of a sample of  large Japanese and  U.S.  firms found that only 12.2 percent
of the Japanese presidents held more than 0.5%  percent of their company's  stock  in 1981, compared to
22.6  percent of the U.S.  CEOs.  S.  Kaplan,  "Internal Corporate Governance  in Japan and the U.S.:
Differences in Activity and Horizons,"  unpublished manuscript,  U. Chicago.  Another set of studies
found that the average U.S.  CEO owns about  1.8 percent  of his company's  stock, compared  to about
.25 percent for the average Japanese company president.  S.  Kaplan,  "Top Executive Rewards and
Firm  Performance:  A Comparison of Japan and  the U.S.,"  draft paper,  University  of Chicago Graduate
School of Business, July 1992.  Explicit profit sharing contracts  are also  rare with Japanese
management circles.  C. Kester,  "Capital and  Ownership Structure: A Comparison  of United States and
Japanese Manufacturing  Corporations,"  Financial  Management, Spring  1986.
33.  This evidence is reviewed in Black, sup  note  14, pp.  23-27.15
Stock ownership by non-managerial  employees is being pushed in the U.S. through
Employee Stock Ownership Plans ("ESOPs") and is a common theme in several privatization
proposals in CEE countries. 34 There is an unresolved debate concerning the effect of ESOP-
type programs on company performance."  On the one hand, employee ownership can in
theory enhance the productivity  of employees  and managers by increasing both the return
worker-shareholders  receives from increased work effort and the infonnation avai!able  to
those worker-shareholders  in monitoring  managers.  Like the two earlier examples of
interrelated contractual  arrangements, the employee-employer  relationship  and the
shareholder-firm  relationship  reinforce one another to strengthen each.  On the other hand,
some,  fear that employee  ownership retards labor mobility and impedes managerial freedom.
The weight of empirical evidence seems to suggest that employee  ownership does not reduce
productivity  and may enhance it, especially if it combined with direct employee participation
in firm decision making. 36
In the three examples of "linked shareholders" discussed above--i.e. with banks.
suppliers/purchasers,  and employees--the  importance  of the linkage depends in part of the
role and viability of the formal legal system in enforcing contracts.  This was noted earlier
with regard to commercial  contracts in Japan; the same holds in theory for the other types of
contracts. The equity link becomes more important if 1ebt collection is difficult (in the case
of banks) or if labor contracts are unreliable (in the case of employees)  The additional
commitment,  power, information,  and "voice" gained by shareholders  through equity
ownership gives both parties greater incentive  to resolve differences regarding debt or labor
contracts and thus preserve their long-term relationships.
In addition to the question of incentive is that of ability to monitor. The ability to
monitor is first and foremost tied to access to information. Often, access to company
information  depends upon the nature of one's relationship  with the company.  For example,
lenders that require certain information  for loan assessment automatically  have information
equally relevant to investment  planning. They are also able to maintain  a close relationship
with management  during the term of a loan.  Given this natural insider's position. in addition
to their accumulated  experience in making many loans, banks are likely to be well-positioned
to take a lead in corporate governance. The same may be true for institutional  investors that
have the power to demand information  and the resources and expertise to interpret it
adequately. Commercial  partners, e.g. in Japan, can gain extensive informnation  on the
34.  For example,  the Polish privatization law calls for the distribution  of up to  10 percent  of the shares of
privatized companies to employees, and the Sloven.e-  law calls for the sale of  20 percent of such shares
to employees at reduced price.  More generally,  the latter law is designed to promote  insider ownership
and control of privatized  firms by giving insiders the right to purchase the bulk of company shares over
time at  "book" value.
35.  For a summary of the arguments,  see Barbara Lee,  "Should Employee Participation Be Part of
Privatization?",  World Bank Working Paper 664.  May  1991.
36.  Lee.  id. p.  10.16
health of each others' firms by observing directly their behavior in commercial  dealings.  In
all of these cases contractual linkages lead to greater information  and thus enhance the ability
of shareholders  to monitor management.
Implications  for Central and Eastern Europe.  On the one hand, certain characteristics
of the CEE environment reinforce this argument in favor of contractual linkages.  First, the
relative weakness  of other market constraints on managers (such as competition  in product or
capital markets) makes shareholder monitoring--and  any links that enhance it--particularly
critical.  Second, the weakness of accounting  and other information  systems and resulting
lack of information  available to "outsiders"  strengthens the need to involve those with direct
information  (including  contracting  partners) in the oversight process.  Furthermore, a U.S.-
type system requires not only extensi"  e access to information, but also a large network  of
people (stockbrokers, credit rating a, -!n_ies,  regulators, venture capitalists, etc.) able to
evaluate such information. Such expertise is likely to be scarce in Central and Eastern
Europe for some time to come.  Finally, the lack of experience and relative incapacity  of the
formal legal system in enforcing contracts heightens  the need for other, less formal incentives
for parties to abide by contracts.  Indeed, in this environment  the pattern of equity ownership
may be the key not only to corporate governance  but also to smooth contractual relationships
in many areas of the economy.
On the other hand, contractual interlirikages  such as those suggested above can be
dangerous  if the entire system lacks disciplirne  and accountability,  as is true in much of the
CEE region.  For example, if banks lack adequate prudential supervision, they may make
both bad investment  decisions ard bad loans and thus become integrally intertwined in a
downward-spiraling  economic relationship  with weak firns.  Similarly, strong equity and
supply interlinkages  among finns may lead to a "domino" affect whereby each firm's health
depends so heavily on the health of the others that they continually  bail each other out rather
than risking the collapse of the entire system. A key to avoiding this downward spiral in the
case of banks is strong prudential supervision  by an independent  body, generally  the central
bank, combined with market competition. Other intermediaries, such as mutual funds or
pension funds, will also be effective  corporate owners and overseers only if they themselves
are well-governed,  adequately regulated, and subject to market discipline.  External
discipline  is also important in the case of interfirm ownership, but here the bulk of the
discipline  must come from market forces, supplemented  in special cases by the limits
imposed by antimonopoly  legislation. In sum, strengthening  the role of  "linked" owners  is
likely to improve  corporate governance,  provided prudential regulation and market  forces
(including  competition  from international  trade) are strong enough to provide some external
discipline  and accountability  to the system as a whole.
The role of existing banks in corporate ownership and governance in CEE is currently
the subject of intense debate.  As noted above, banks potentially possess both the incentives
and the information  needed to exert a very positive influence  as shareholders. However,
existing banks are heavily laden with bad debts, weak incentives, poorly trained staff, and
inefficient  procedures, all carried over from socialism. In the CEE context it is important  to17
distinguish between different types of actual or potential lenders:  (1) old banks, which have
a legacy of problems  and ingrained habits carried over from socialism  and are themselves
usually in need of restructuring; (2) new banks, which may or may not be viable entities but
in any case face a different set of problems and incentives, and (3) privatization
intermediaries, which could potentially  taKe  on an expanded lending role in the future but
face yet another set of potential  problems.  Sow.  - observers believe  that the current banking
systems are not worth salvaging, and that they should be phased out and gradually replaced
by new banking institutions. Others believe that existing banks can be salvaged to play a
useful corporate governance role if their existing stock of bad debts is lifted (replaced  at least
in part with equity through debt-equity swaps) and if they are privatized to create profit-
maximizing  incentives. More in-depth research is needed to throw light on this debate.
Ultimately  the answer is more likely to be case-by-case  than across the board, because both
the capabilities of existing banks and the ease of building new institutions  is likely to vary by
country.
Translating Ownership  into Control:  The Corporate  Legal Framework
In addition  to laws regulating ownership, the second major variable that influences  the
effectiveness  of shareholder  monitoring is the legal cramework  in which such monitoring
takes place.  This legal framework--contained  primarily in company laws, securities laws,
rules of the stock exchange, competition  laws, and laws on fiduciary responsibility--defines
the power of shareholders, oversight  boards, and outsiders to observe and influence
managerial  behavior.
Shareholder Rights and Powers
Numerous legal rules, contained  primarily in company laws, affect the way a firm's
ownership structure is translated into shareholder influence  through voting.  The company
laws of CEE countries  provide extensive flexibility for each company  to adjust voting rights
to suit its own needs (Table 2).  This flexibility is generally  desirable because it allows
control to be distributed  differently from ownership. It is particularly  appropriate for CEE in
the short-run, in that it allows focused  control (crucial for quick, effective restructuring) in
the absence of concentrated  ownership or custodial voting power.
First, shares can be assigned different voting rights.  In the U.S., companies may
issue stock carrying more than one vote; however, firms listed on the New York Stock
Exchange must comply with the one share-one vote rule.  Under Japan's company law, all
common stock is subject  to the one-vote rule. 37 Germany's company law has a similar one-
share one-vote rule, although  companies may issue multiple-vote  shares in exceptional
37.  Article 241.Table,2:  PROVISIONS  OF CEE COMPANY  LAWS'
Poland  |  CSFR  | Hungary  Romania  |  Bulgaria
Voing  Rules
I  Apparendy
Votes per share  I to 5  1  unlimited  I  1
May be  May be  May be  May bs  Statute
Votes per shareholder  limited  limited  linited  limited  appears silent
Statute  Determined
Minimum Quorum  appears  in Articles  of
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--fundamental  changes  75%  66%  75%  50% (2/3 of a  unless
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management
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--electing management  appears  task of Sup.  >50%  Board  unless task of
silent  Board  Sup. Board
--removing  directors,  >  50 % unless
supervisors  >50%  taskofSup.  >50%  >50%  >50%




Two Tiers Required  exceeds ZI  Always  Always  Not required  Optional
5 bill.
May elect  May elect
Employee  Representation  No special  1/3-1/2 if  1/3 if  No special  No special
on Supervisory  Board  provisions  over 50  employees  provisions  provisions
employees  average 200
1  Source: CEE company legislation.  This information  is tentative  because the laws are often unclear.
Furthermore, actual practice may vary considerably  from these legal guidelines.19
circumstances  (if the public interest will be furthered). 3"  In all cases, preferred shares--i.e.
non-voting shares with a dividend preference--are  allowed.  Wnile the une share-one vote
rule accords with intrinsic notions of fairness, it does not enhance the effectiveness  of
shareholder monitoring  under conditions  of widely disbursed ownership.
In the CEE countries, many company laws allow different shares to be assigned
different voting rights.  In Poland, for example, one share can have up to 5 votes. 39 In
CSFR, 40 Hungary, 4' and Romania, 42 the total votes of certain shareholders  can be limited in
the company statute. In this way ownership can be widely disbursed yet more active and/or
experienced  shareholders  can have greater weight in corporate decisionmakinig.
Second, quorum and/or majority voting rules can be adjusted to shift the powers of
corporate voting blocks.  Company laws generally set mi,mnum requirements for both
quorums and voting majorities, although  companies  are, free to set their own rules,  above
these minimum  levels.  Low quorum figu-es (say 30 percent) or majority vote requirements
give minority blockliolIers more power to push through their own initiatives if other
shareholders  are passive; high requirements  (say 70 percent) give minority blockholders  more
power to veto the majority simply by not "showing  up'  or by voting against a proposal.
The former is likely to be desirable if strong action is needed in the face of many dispersed
and passive shareholders, as may be the case in countries pursuing voucher schemes of
privatization. The latter may be desirable in certain cases of less dispersed ownership where
a minority shareholder  wants firm control over the actions of the majority shareholder, as
may be the case in joint ventures.
In the U.S. the lowest possible quorum figui'e is 33 percent, whereas in Japan it is 50
percent.  Germnany  has no minimum  quorum rule.  The U.S.. Japan, and Gerrnany  all
require at least a simple majority (50 percent) to pass general resolutions, but minimum
required majorities  for fundamental  changes (including  amending the articles of association,
mergers,  or dissolution) range from a simple majority (in the U.S.) 4 3 to 66 percent  (in
Japan) to 75 percent (in Germany).
38.  Aktiengesellschaftensrecht  (law  on Stock Corporations),  Section 12(2).  But see Section  134, which
implies that "the articles of association  may limit the right to vote through establishmerit of a higher
amount or of graduated  scales."
39.  Article 358.
40.  Para.  180.
41.  Article 269.
42.  Article 67.
43.  In practice over the pas, few years, company statutes have increased this percentage as an anti-takeover
measure.20
'The  company laws of CEE vary to about the same extent and provide highly desirable
flexibility for companies  to set rules that best suit their individual  needs.  The CSFR
company law provides a minimum  quorum of 30 percent and requires a simple majority for
most decisions, although either requirement  can be increased by company statute.  The
company laws of other CEE countries generally  have quorum and majority voting rules of 50
percent unless the company's articles provide otherwise. Most of the CEE laws require
supramajority  (two-thirds  or three-quarters)  votes at the general meeting for some important
decisions, such as changes in the company's articles, changes in the rights of certain classes
of shareholders, or sale, merger, or dissolution  of the company.
Third, the voting power of certain shareholders  on issues that most concern them
(such es choice of directors) can be enhanced  through "cumulative votiiig"  rules.
Cumulative  voting was developed  primarily to give minority shareholders  a greater chance of
representation  on the board of directors.  The system entitles each shareholder a number of
votes equal to the number of directors being elected and allows the shareholder  to distribute
those votes among candidates  as he or she chooses.  Thus, all votes can be cast for one
cai,didate, unlike traditional  voting systems in which a shareholder  is entitled to cast only one
vote per seat.  Minority shareholders  can thus elect some directors to the board, even if
majority shareholders  oppose such election, and thereby get a "foot in the door" and increase
both pressure on managers and the chances for a change in control.  Although cumulative
voting has been adopted in certain U.S. states (most notably California, where it is
mandatory)  and as an option (albeit rarely-used)  for companies in Japan, it seems as yet
unknown  in CEE countries.
Fourth, proxy rules can mobilize  the votes of otherwise  passive shareholders.  Proxy
rules are intendeJ as a devise to informn  voters about issues and candidates and let them
exercise their "ownership  voice" through  designated agents rather than attend shareholder
meetings in person.  The impact of the proxy process on corporate governance  depends
heavily on the specific rules regarding access to information, expense allocation, custodial
powers, and control over the process itself.  In the U.S. and Japan, incumbent managers
prepare ballots and make formal recommendations  on the items submitted for shareholder
vote.  The shareholder  then has the opportunity  to vote in person or through a proxy (to
which the shareholder  may give specific  voting instructions  or may delegate the voting
decision). If the shareholder does nothing, that vote is never counted,  Access to shareholder
lists in the U.S. tends to be controlled by incumbent  managers and directors (who are
required to disclose them only to sthareholders  with a "legitimate  business purpose"), making
it hard for dissident shareholders to lobby others to vote against incumbent's
recommendations. In addition, dissident candidates  and proposers of resolutions must pay
for the reproduction  and mailings of their proxy ballots, whereas management's are paid for
by the corporation.
In contrast, German niles on both proxies and custodial rights give banks, in their
status as custodians  to shareholders, great power to recommend  positions independent  from
that of management. Banks submit their own recommendations  to the shareholders for whom21
they serve as custodians. Unless those shareholders  specify voting instructions, the banks are
entitled to vote those shares according to their recommollendations.  Ths,lJS in Gernany the vote
of a passive shareholder is voted by an active shareholder, where as in the U.S. case the
passive shareholder's vote is lost.  Not only are more votes cast, btut  the votes ot passive
shareholders  are arguably more likely to be cast in their best interests.  Most passive
shareholders  who vote in the U.S. vote along with management,  even thoughl  mallagellment's
proposal may not be compatible with the shareholder's interest.  In the German model,
passive shareholders' votes will support the custodial  bank's recomiimendation,  which may
sometimes  differ from that of management.
The oversight  r' :e of intermediaries  in the CEE countries will be strengthened  if their
proxy-voting  powers are enhanced, as in the German model.  Most CEE company laws
provide for pioxy voting if a shareholder  cannot attend a general meeting.  It is unclear,
however, whether or not a custodial system as in Germany  exists or will develop and, if so,
whether custodians (or other intermediaries)  can vote proxies for affiliated shareholders. It is
also unclear how easy it will be for shareholders  to obtain access to shareholder lists to try to
influence  proxy voting, and, if so, who will bear the costs of mailings to shareholders.
The Role of Oversight Bodies
The advanced market economies. Because few shareholders  can actively monitor the
day-to-day activities of management,  they elect representatives  to do the job for them.
Corporations  in the U.S. and Japan have boards of directors.  U.S. boards are typically
composed of both inside officers and outsiders, while Japanese boards are composed  entirely
of insiders.  The board appoints the chief executive  officer of the company, who in turn
appoints other officers.  In addition to selecting (and dismissing)  management,  the board
approves major decisions, such as declarations  of dividends, corporate borrowing, and other
business strategies. It also approves proposals for mergers, sales of substantial  corporate
assets, and dissolution, which are then subject to shareholder  vote.
Although  members of the board are elected by the shareholders, boards of U.tu.
companies  have often been seen as partners of incumbent  management  rather than protectors
of shareholders' rights.  For example, management  maintains  significant  power over the
board through its ability to recommend  board candidates  during elections (as most proxy
voters follow management's recommendations). In recent years there has been a stronger
push, particularly from larger institutional  shareholders, to appoint more independent
members to corporate boards, and much of the literature on U.S. corporate governance
emphasizes this as a primary direction of reform in the future."
44.  For erample,  Pound identifies numerous  means by which investors are attempting to exert more
independent voice,  including not only slates of independent directors but also shareholder-sponsored
"shadow" management committees and outside experts to critique specific operating policies.  See
Pound,  supra note  1.22
In contrast, oversight bodies have always been significantly  more independent  in
,.ermany.  Each German corporation has a management  board and a supervisory  board.  The
former is responsible for runni.ag  the comp..ny  on a day-to-day  basis, while the !atter is
composed exclusively  of outsiders.  Unlike in the U.S. case, metnbers  of the management
b)ard may nut sit on the supervisory board, and vice versa.  The supervisory board ha 3 two
main responsibilities--to  supervise the management  board and to appoint all of its members
(not just the chief officer) for five-year  terms.  The members of the management  board may
be fired only for cause and thus maintain  a fair amount of independence  in their day-to-day
decisionmaking.
Much of the independenice  of Gennan sup.ervi .y boards arises trom the more
concentrated  patterns of ownership in German firms.  Because supervisors are elected by
shareholders, and banks control many votes, banks typically have one or more appointees
(often including  the chairperson), who are viewed as direct representatives  of those banks.
Similarly, under the policy of "codetermination,"  employees  are entitled to elect one-half of
the supervisory  board,  These appointees  are neither beholden  to management  nor loyal to a
diffuse, abstract shareh, Ider body.  As a result, their loyalties are concentrated  and concrete,
which insures greater independence  from management. In most cases no one shareholder  has
absolute control, but a coalition of independent  shareholders  does.
Although the formal Japanese oversight  structure resembles that of the U.S., the
balance of power between managers and shareholders  in Japan anpears in reality to be closer
to that of Germany.  The more concentrated  institutional  ownership of individuial  firns  and
the interlocking  business relationships  within the keiretsu both strengthen the voice of
shareholder  representatives, functioning  in Japan not so much through formal board meetings
as through less formal monthly meetings  of the Presidents' Council.  Again, shareholders  are
not mere abstractions but are clearly represented in their various representatives, who are not
as psychologically,  socially, or financially  dependent  on the CEO as in the U.S. 45
Governance  power in all three countries is also related to the power to set
compensation  levels for overseers and managers.  The compensation  of outside board
members is not usually contioversial. Because a certain prestige is associatedl  with board
membership,  compensation  is rarely the prime motivating  factor for such individuals. Thus,
compensation  is typically  modest and must be approved by shareholders. In contrast,
management  compensation  is much higher, particularly in the U.S.,46  making it a source of
increasing  controversy,.  Shareholders  vote on managerial  compensation  in the U.S. and
Japan, but the proposed packages  on which they are voting are often so complex that
45.  Roe, suDra  note 8. p. 26.
46.  Managerial  compensation  is typically  much smaller in Japan than in the U.S..  Takao Kato and Mark
Rockel, "Experiences,  credentials  and compensation  in the Japanese  and U.S. managerial  labor
markets: Evidence  from new micro  data," Journal of the Japanese  and Intermational  Economies  6,
1992, pp. 30-51.23
assessment of their value is difficult. 47 Supervisory  boards determine the salaries of Germnan
managers.  Recent  research appears to indicate that management turnover,  and to some
extent managerial compensation, does bear some (albeit limited) relation in all three countries
to firm performance (particularly  if such performance,  whether measured through  stock price
or through earnings,  is negative). 48
Central and Eastern  Europe.  Thie CEE countries have generally followed the German
model of oversight for joint stock companies, 49 providing  for hands-on management by an
administrative board (sometimes called a board of directors  or management board) and
oversight functions by an independent supervisory board.  Independent auditors may also be
required for larger countries.  In both law and practice,  the division of responsibility among
these various bodies can vary greatly by company (within general guidelines set out in the
laws).  Bulgaria has a hybrid  system, in that a joint  stock company can have either  a "two-
tier" system (management and supervisory boards) or a more simple  "one-tier" system (a
board of directors only).  Romania differs from the others  in that its company law does not
provide for a supervisory board,  although its  "Board of Administration"  may delegate some
of its powers to a managing committee, 50 thus in effect creating a system somewhat like the
others.
Control over the selection of board members greatly affects their independence.  The
company laws of CSFR,5 '  Hungary, 52 and Poland 53 allow both thc board of directors and the
supervisory  board to be elected directly by shareholders,  arguably making the board of
directors  less directly accountable to the supervisory  board.  In the CSFR5 4 and Polish 55
47.  Recent SEC regulations have required U.S.  companies to report executive compensation in a more
transparent  manner,  making it easier for shareholders to evaluate  the total package.
48.  S. Kaplan, supra note 32: S. Kaplan.  "Top Executives,  Tumover  and F'irm Performance  in Germany,
draft paper,  University of Chicago Graduate School ot  Business. February  1993: NI. Jensen and K.
Murphy,  "Performance  Pay and Top Management Incentives." J.  Pol. Econ. 98.  1990, pp.  225-264.
49.  Management and oversight  strmctures  are  generally simpler for limited liability companies than for joint
stock companies,  reflecting their smaller number of owners  and the underiving  assumption that the
owners know each other and have regular contacts.
50.  Article 98.
51.  Para.  194.
52.  Article 285 (3).
53.  Articles 366 (3),  379 (1).
54.  Para.  194 (1).
55.  Article 366 (3).24
cases,  the company statutes may change this by providing  (as in Germany) that the
supervisory board elects and dismisses the members of the board of directors,  and in Poland
the supervisory board may suspenci "fl r  serious reasons" members of the board of directors
elected by the general  meeting. 56 Bulgaria follows the German model  in its two-tier system,
providing that members of the management board are elected and  recalled by the supervisory
board.5"  In all of the two-tier systems, persons cannot serve on both boards simultaneously.
In Romania,  in contrast,  the head of the managing committee must also be a member of the
administrative board--and arrangement  similar to the U.S.  (with the attendant  lack of
independence).
An additional issue is the role of workers in the selection of overseers.  CSFR and
Hungary follow the German model of codetermnination  in large companies (defined as those
with over 50 and 200 employees,  respectively) by giving employees the right to elect one-
third of the supervisory board.  The wisdom of this policy is widely debated.  On the one
hand, employee representation may help to improve worker-manager  relations,  thereby
decreasing  strikes and other worker disrup.ions and increasing worker productivity.  On the
other hand,  some believe that it skews company policy in favor of workers as opposed to
shareholders and lowers company efficiency and growth.
These governance systems are largely untested in the CEE context because of the
small size of the private sector in general and the particular  shortage of widely held medium-
and large-sized private companies.  On the positive side, the countries'  company laws try to
establish checks and balances by requiring independent oversight bodies, whether supervisory
boards or auditors or both.  They draw a clear  line between management and oversight by
eliminating overlapping  membership in the two bodies.  Some try to accommodate the
interests of workers through allowing them representation on supervisory boards.  Yet it is
unclear whether these provisions alone will lead to independent corporate  governance.  A
major lesson of the U.S.,  German, and Japanese experiences is that the efficacy of oversight
bodies,  which depends in large part on their degree of independence from management,  is
correlated  with the degree of concentration of share ownership.  If shareholding or share
voting rights (via proxies) are relatively concentrated,  then members of oversight bodies are
likely to be more independent from  management in practice than if shareholding and voting
rights are diffuse.
Oversight bodies,  no matter how well-designed.  will not function adequately if the
members  lack competence and are not held to high standards of fiduciary responsibility.
Relative to the sharply  rising demand resulting both from privatization and from
"corporatization"  of the state sector, there is a severe shortage of persons in CEE countries
who have the requisite knowledge to be effective board meimbers.  Although time,
experience,  and training  will help ameliorate this problem  in the medium-term,  it will
56.  Article 383.
57.  Article 241 (2).25
seriously affect prospects for effective corporate governance in the short run.  Limiting  the
number of members  of boards to the minimum  allowable  by law and including some
foreigners as members  can help.  Allowing people to serve as directors on several boards
may also help, but this advantage must be weighed against two potential  disadvantages:  (1)
conflicts of interest that could arise if one person were serving on the boards of cornpeting
companies, and (2) the collective  disincentives  tor strong and honest oversight  that could
arise in an entrenched body of interlocking  directorates.
With regard to standards of conduct, the powers of managers and members of
oversight boards need to be moderated  to prevent self-dealing  and protect the rights of
minority shareholders  and the general public.  In most market economies, managers  and
directors are held to a general standard of reasonable  care, but the extent to which this
standard is enforced  depends on a variety of factors, including  culture and access to
information  on managerial  or supervisory  behavior.  Among the advanced market economies,
law suits alleging fiduciary irresponsibility  nave been most common  in the U.S., and many
have been related to takeover battles in which shareholders  believed their interests were being
sacrificed  to those of incumbent  managers  and directors.  In both Germany  and Japan,
shareholder  suits are much rarer.  In Germany there are no legal restrictions on such suits,
but the awareness  of shareholder  rights has developed more slowly than in the U.S., due  to
the large role of the banks.  Furthermore, in their capacity as liaison between shareholding
clients and companies,  banks control the flow of information  between the two, thereby
checking shareholder  litigation. Under Japanese law shareholders  may sue their managers
and directors, but cultural preference for private negotiation  over public litigation reduces the
number of shareholder  suits.  Of course, this private negotiation  is available primarily to
more influential  shareholders  or coalitions  of smaller shareholders.
Most of the company laws and civil codes of CEE countries establish  a general
standard of due care for directors and officers.  Their legal institutions,  however, are not
well-developed  and may have difficulty  playing a major role in enforcing this standard in the
near-term.
Disclosure Rules
The competence  both of shareholders in their voting decisions and of supervisors in
their governance  is fundamentally  affected by the availability  of information. An effective
legal infrastructure  is needed to specify and enforce disclosure standards for all companies,
especially those issuing securities to the public.  Stringent disclosure rules are appropriate in
the CEE context.  These rules need not impose detailed SEC-type  reporting requirements  but
rather can require widespread  disclosure of routine accounting information  prepared
according to standard international  accounting principles.  Financial  reporting lies at the core
of business accountability. Such reporting provides investors with the most basic informnation
required to assess the risk and value of an investment, and thus helps share prices fully
reflect share values.  Financial disclosure  rules should be uniform across industries to avoid
information  and price asymmetries--i.e. under- or overpriced  securities--that  skew investment26
decisions.  Stringent disclosure rules should also apply to other items,  such as business plans
and projections  events that mzay  affect stock prices,  managerial compensation,"  and
shareholder  lists.
Differences in accounting standards can have major implications.  For example,
whereas  U.S.  compa,lies must disclose figures on their reserve accounts,  German companies
are not required to reveal these figures.  Thus,  German profit statements may not be entirely
accurate if,  for example, the company borrows  from the reserve account to enhance protits.
Due to this disclosure policy, German stocks are prohibited  from being listed on SEC-
regulated exchanges in the U.S.,  although the increasing need for foreign capital may result
in reconsideration of this policy  in the U.S. 59 Indeed, numerous national exchanges are
moving to relax reporting requirements for foreign firms." 6
The frequency of reporting may also affect corporate activity.  For example,  the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that publicly held companies prepare
financial reports on a quarterly  basis.  This  has been criticized for fostering short-term
pressures on management, which often result in moves designed to enhance quarterly  reports
(e.g.  selling off assets, cutting  research, or laying off ernployees) at the expense of long-term
investments.  In contrast,  German and Japanese companies produce profit/loss  statements
either annually or semi-annually, 6"  a frequency that is probably appropriatc  for CEE
countries  as well.
Of course,  any legal rules must be enforceable to be effective, and the weakness of
enforcement capacity in the public sector may constrain  governance capacity in the private
sector.  Furthermore,  disclosure rules rnay  not by themselves be sufficient if shareholding is
58.  It is interesting  to note that the U.S. SEC has  just tightened  its disclosure  standards  on rnanage.-ial
compensation,  in response  to the loud and growing  dissatisfaction  among shareholders  with the high
levels  of executive  salaries and their seering  scant relation to performance. D. S. Hilzenrath.
`Shareholder Rights Expand",  Washington Post,  October  16,  1992, p.  1.
59.  The European banking industry has recently faced a similar disclosure issue.  The International
Accounting Standards Committee  (IASC) has recently  issued Standard 30,  which prohibits hidden
reserves  for loan losses and other banking risks.  Despite the lack of enforceability of IASC standards,
the European Community and its banks are  increasingly recognizing the advantages of  full disclosure
(greater access to international financial markets,  improved shareholder relations) over the advantages
of hidden reserves.  Financial World, vol.  160. No. 5,  Mar.  5.  1991, p.  34-35.  For example,  in
response to demands from  international investors and competition from non-German depository  banks,
Deutsche Bank became the first German bank to publish  it full operating profits.  Economist,  June 22,
1991, p.  79.
60.  Accounting Horizons,  vol.  5,  no. 3.  Sept.  1991, p.  69-80.
61.  The US also requires disclosure of a 5-10 year historical  development of sales, net income,  and other
important data, in order  to give investors a longer-term  view of the company.  Japan has no such
requirement.27
widely dispersed and shareholders lack the means or incentive  to verify the information
disclosed. Thus, these rules should be accompanied  by external auditing requirements. The
audit of the annual financial statements  by independent  and qualified auditors underpins
disclosure rules and is a key element of corporate governance.
Outsiders and the Market for Corporate Control
Corporate and securities laws not only determine  the competence  of shareholders  and
their inside representatives  in overseeing management,  but they also determine the ease with
which outsiders can affect management  through the market for cororate  control--i.e. through
takeover.  The typical targets for takeovers are firms whose share prices are perceived by
outsiders to be lower than the company's true worth.  If such undervaluation  is seen to result
from inefficient  management,  a successful  acquirer will replace incumbent  managers.  In this
way, the securities market imposes a discipline  on managers by exposing their companies  to
possible  takeovers and themselves  to likely replacement. That very discipline  creates
complex conflicts of interest, however, between managers, directors, and shareholders.
Managers are typically  against involuntary  takeovers, because they are likely to lose their
jobs.  Shareholders  can benefit from such takeovers, however, if the new managers are more
efficient; empirical studies of mergers and other acquisitions  show that most takeovers result
in rising share prices. 62 Directors are caught in the middle; they also risk losing their
positions on the Board if the takeover succeeds,  but their fiduciary duties and often their day-
to-day interests are clearly tied to those of the shareholders  they represent.
One crucial legal issue is thus the distribution  of decision making authority among
management,  the board, and shareholders. Because the decision to entertain a takeover bid
usually  begins (and often ends) with the board, the crux of the controversy  is the extent of
shareholder, particularly minority shareholder, participation  in takeover decisions.  Some
argue that, as residual claimants who stand the most to gain or lose in such a move,
shareholders should be entitled to vote on takeover decisions. This extra monitoring  device
supplements  their most basic power. the ability to oust directors.  The counterargument  is
that shareholders are passive  investors who delegate business decisions to directors,  and since
mergers are one kind of business decision, power to approve or reject them should remain
with those most qualified to make them.
Other aspects of corporate and securities laws also help determine tl'e power of the
incumbent  management  and board, and thus the ease with which outsiders can affect
management through the takeover  market.  Liquid stock markets and tough disclosure rules
(including disclosure of shareholder  lists) make takeovers easier,  while anti-takeover
62.  Easterbrook  and Fischel, "Voting  in Corporate Law."  6 J. Law & Econ. 395. 416 (1983).  On the
other hand, highly leveraged  takeovers  can be destructive,  as is evidenced  in the U.S. by the
bankruptcies  following  the mergers and acquisitions  of the 1980s.  "LBOs  of the '80s Become
Prepackaged  Bankruptcies  of the '90s," Business  Credit, October 1991, p. 15.28
legislation, 63 "poison pills,"'  and restrictive voting rules all make takeov  ers more
difficult.
The market for corporate control has been very active in the U.S., particularly in the
1980s. In contrast, hostile takeovers have been rare in Japan./ 5 The reason is partially
legal in nature.  Although  Japanese takeover rules are modelled  on those of the U.S., certain
legal provisions inhibited hostile takeover activity throughout the 1980s.  For example,
Japanese boards of directors were entitled to defend against takeover attempts by issuing low-
priced shares to friendly companies ("white knights") in order to dilute the percentage of the
hostile buyer 66 without sacrificing practical control of the company.  No shareholder  vote
was required for such move.  Although such defensive moves are no longer possible,
takeovers will probably continue to be rare for structural and cultural reasons.  On the
structural side, the large percentage of shares owned by long-term shareholders with close
business ties to the company makes many buyouts prohibitively  costly.  On the cultural side,
it is thought that a hostile takeover would destroy the target company's sense of "wa," or
internal harnony, making it difficult to integrate  the target into the acquiring "keiretsu"."6
Similarly, hostile takeovers have been less common in Gernany than in the U.S..
The reliance of German firms on debt rathe- than equity financing has had two major
implications:  first, companies  have tended not to look to equity markets for capital, which
63.  This legisl.:ion,  appearing  recently in the U.S.  and the U.K.,  makes takeovers more time consuming
and expensive.  For example,  it may require that a bidder who acquires  30% of a company bid for the
entire company.  In addition,  bidders must also disclose significant stakes  eariy on and  stick to a
measured timetable in building  up these stakes, which perrnits share prices to increase (as opposed  to
sudden buyouts, which tend to drive prices down due to the "prisoner's  dilemma"  instinct to defect in
the absence of information on other shareholders'  strategies).  "Takeovers a la carte,"  Economist,
December 21.  1991, p.  I1.  It may also broaden the corporate constituency beyond shareholders to
include employees and suppliers,  forcing management to include their  interests when considering a  bid.
64.  "Poison pill" is a generic  term  that describes any provision in a company's  articles  of association that is
triggered by a takeover attempt and is intended to make the target company  less attractive.  Such
provisions may offer better redundancy terms for employees,  put its pension funds under independent
management. or otherwise prevent the bidding company from  making the profit  it had hoped.  If
takeovers benefit shareholders,  poison pills harm them, because they reduce the value of the company
to bidders.  On the other hand,  poison pills have also been interpreted as formalizing previously
implicit contracts between managers and various  stakeholders in a firm.  Under this  interpretation,  they
can benefit shareholders  by helping to preserve long-term stability.  See A. Schleifer and L. Summers,
"Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers,"  in A. Auerbach,  ed.,  Corporate  Takeovers:  Causes and
Consequences, Chicago U.  Press,  1991.
65.  As of  1989, twenty years  after takeover rules  were introduced,  there had only been two takeover bids
in Japan.  "Japan to Relax Rules on Takeovers."  Financial Times, November 6,  1989. p.  43.
66.  "Mergers and  Acquisitions in Japan; Lifting a Barrier or Two,"  Economist,  Aug.  12.  1989. p.  68.
67.  "'Hijacking'  Now Respectable in Japan,"  Financial Times, January  18.  1990. p.  43.29
reduced tumover in the stock market generally; and second, powerful bank holdings and
proxy voting strength have dissuaded investors from seeking control.  Also. Germnany  was
known for having  the toughest anti-takeover  devices in all of Europe. 68 The picture may
now be changing slightly, as German takeovers appear to be on the rise.
Takeover mechanisms remain largely untested in CEE, although their importance  may
grow with privatization. Indeed, promoting competition  in the privatization  process itself is
analogous in many ways to allowing  an unfettered  takeover market, in that the right of
corporate ownership arid management  is allowed to gravitate to those who believe they can
manage most efficiently  and effectively. The allocation of decision making authority and the
availability  of legal defenses against takeovers  are both likely to be difficult issues.  On the
one hand, mergers and acquisitions  may be highly desirable in this environment  given the
extent of inefficiency  in current industrial structure  and management,  and giving greater
authority to shareholders  while minimizing  a firm's legal defenses will help minimize insider
opposition  to such transactions. On the other hand, giving shareholders  extensive decision
making authority may be futile or even counterproductive  if they are themselves unorganized
or uninformed  and if the stock market is relatively illiquid.
Conclusions
Pattems of corporate ownership and governance  in advanced market economies  vary
immensely, the result not only of policy choice but also of cultural and political differences
and historical accident. None of those patterns can be copied wholesale  onto the Central and
Eastern European scene.  However, the experiences  of the United States. Gerrmany,  and
Japan do poirnt  to certain lessons and tradeoffs that the CEE countries should consider.
First, there is probably some tradeoff between wealth distribution  and the efficacy of
corporate governance in an economy.  Theory and to some extent practice support the view
that tighter ownership patterns lead to better corporate performance. However, more widely
disbursed ownership patterns clearly have other economic  and social benefits that are
important in the CEE context and to some extent (along with speed) motivate  the "mass
privatization"  plans.  The use of institutional  intermediaries  and creative legal frameworks  to
concentrate voice more than ownership may be a partial solution to the dilemma. Stronger
and more committed  voice might also be gained by encouraging  ownership by parties with
other long-term  contractual interests, whether as suppliers, employees, or creditors.
Second, there is likely to be some tradeoff between industrial structure and the
efficacy of corporate governance. Given a certain distribution  of ownership in an economy,
smaller firms mean fewer owners, greater stakes per owner, and thus greater incentives  and
lower costs for shareholder  monitoring.  Yet CEE industrial structure tends to be highly
68.  'Europe's Corporate  Castles Begin to Crack,"  Economist,  November 30,  1991, p. 67.30
concentrated. Although there may other benefits to preserving such concentration  in some
industries, antimonopoly  and privatization  policies should not leave the governance  issue out
of the equation.
Finally, there is clearly an important  tradeoff between the efficacy of corporate
governance and concerns of safety and soundness  in financial intermediaries. The United
States represents one extreme, where concerns of safety and soundness  dorninate, virtually
eliminating active participation  by banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual
funds in corporate governance. Germany  and Japan are on the other side (although  perhaps
not to such an extreme), allowing financial  intermediaries  (and other related firms) a major
voice in corporate governance. Unfortunately,  this tradeoff is even more difficult in Central
and Eastem Europe because of the lack of alternative tools to achieve either goal.  On the
one hand, legal and information  systems  are relatively weak, making it difficult to identify
and eliminate irresponsible self-dealing  by fiduciaries in the intermediary  institutions.
Furthermore, the high degree of risk in these economies  argues strongly in favor of
diversification  on safety and soundness  grounds.  On the other hand, product, capital, and
labor markets are often under-developed,  and thus there may be few other constraints to
discipline  company managers in the absence of active shareholder  monitoring.  On balance,
the CEE countries would arguably be wise to err on the side of stronger corporate
governance--more  along German or Japanese than along U.S. models.Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
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